Rajendra Singh and Ors versus State of Uttaranchal ETC

             This is criminal appeal case where all appellants, father, son and son-in-law were accused for the murder of Pushpendra Singh. They were acquitted by the Trial Court but were convicted by High Court  under Section 302 ,IPC [ Section 103(1) of BNS] and a fine of Rs. 10,000 on each were imposed vide judgment and order.

            Therefore all the three accused, being aggrieved, preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

                                                    

            Before the Supreme Court, the appellant submitted that they were falsely implicated and there is no reliable evidence to establish that they were alleged assailant except the lady of the house into which the deceased had entered to save his life, who did not know the names of the accused person.

            On the other hand, the State Counsel opposed the submissions of the appellant and submitted –

1.        all the three accused were seen by the witnesses chasing the deceased, who had entered the house of the lady which fact was witnessed by the lady;

2.        the clothes of a prosecution witness i.e the lady which had blood stains were sealed by the police and the FSL report confirmed the presence of blood on the clothes;

3.        on the disclosure of the appellants, the weapons of crime were recovered, and they admitted to having committed the crime with the same.

 Therefore the High Court had rightly reversed the decision of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court to convict the appellants for the offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment – State submitted lastly.

                        After careful examination of the rival submission and the facts in record of the testimony of the witnesses, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellants and acquitting them on the benefit of doubt, which the High Court had erred in reversing the finding of the Trial Court without concluding that the findings were perverse.

            As there was a quarrel with the father of the deceased and the appellants, the altercation between the two groups may be a motive to attack and kill the deceased, but by itself would not be sufficient to implicate them unless their involvement in the offence is established by cogent evidence – the Court opined.

            Therefore, the top Court raised a question that whether the appellants were the real persons who chased and killed the deceased which has to be ascertained on the basis of ocular evidence.

           

FACTS AND FINDINGS

I.          In the given case, the lady of the house is the primary witness who clearly deposed that the three accused persons killed the boy in the house who were carrying swords and other weapons in their hands. She tried to refrain the accused appellants from assaulting  the deceased and in that process, her clothes got stained with bloods of the deceased who fell down on the dewan after sustaining injuries. Thereafter nobody inflicted injury on the deceased. The father of deceased came after half an hour.

            The lady stated that she did not know the name of the accused persons but had only seen three unknown persons.

            The Court viewed on the fact the police failed to get the appellants identified by her by a process of Identification parade. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the persons who assaulted the deceased were actually the appellants – the top Court noticed.

II.        Secondly, the prosecution sought to establish the identity of the accused persons with the testimony of the father of the deceased (Prosecution witness-1) and PW-2 who arrived only after half an hour after the alleged assault.

            He is therefore, not actually an eye-witness who was present at the time when the appellants allegedly attacked the deceased.

III.       Thirdly, the clothes of the father(PW-1 which got stained to hugging his deceased son after he fell down on the dewan, was never offered for investigation by the police nor was seized. But he stated that he washed them and wore them again.

            To this, the top Court opined that PW-1 was not actually present when the incident of assault took place and the story of hugging the deceased son was concocted.

2.        PW-1 is chance witness and probably may not have seen the appellants coming on the bike or chasing the deceased because the diversion place where the assault was committed was not on the way back to his home and it was very unnatural to go to the diversion while returning from the flour mill – Court viewed.

            Therefore, according to Top Court , PW-1 cannot be treated as a trustworthy witness and his evidence cannot be relied upon to identify the appellants as the persons who have attacked and assaulted the deceased.

            Furthermore no independent persons of the area where the assault happened were called upon to enter the witness box to corroborate the evidence of prosecution witness – Court noticed.

            Therefore the ocular evidence of PW-1 and 2 is not sufficient to identify the appellants as the persons who actually attacked and assaulted the deceased resulting in his death – Court asserted.

            Then, the Top Court emphasizing on the validity of chance witness as held in various previous decisions said that the deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of incident is doubtful should be discarded, or atleast be treated with great caution and close scrutiny. Such a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of incident. Such principle was not satisfactorily followed in the instant case.

 

3.        The fact regarding the recovery of weapons of crime is that the weapons i.e sword was recovered from a garage and another sword and Kanta from an open space. Undoubtedly the weapons were recovered only after pointed out by the appellants but effort was not made to match the blood on the weapons with that of the deceased.

            On the basis of the fact regarding the recovery of weapons of crime indicated by the appellants, the same cannot be accepted in view of Section 25 and 26 read with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 23 Bharatiya  Shakshya Adhiniyam, 2023)

            “Only the that part of the statement which leads the police to the recovery of the weapons is admissible, and not the part which alleges that the weapons recovered were actually the weapons of crime” – Supreme Court reiterated following the recent decision held in the case of Manjunath and Ors vs. State of Karnataka (2023). It was said the case that “so much of the information” as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible, and the rest of the information stands excluded. In other words, the information leading to the recovery of the weapons of crime is admissible, but not the information that the crime was actually committed by the said weapons.

After careful examination of the submissions and testimony of the witness and the facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court acquitted the appellants because the identity of the appellants as the persons involved in the offence was not established either by any ocular evidence or from the recovery of the weapons of crime.

 

Rajendra Singh and Ors versus State of Uttranchal ETC. (Criminal Appeal No. 476-477 of 2013.

Coram Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale

Date of Judgment: October 7, 2025.

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