External Aid of Construction
TABLE OF CONTENT
5. Historical facts and surrounding circumstances
6. Later social, political and economic development
7. Reference to other statutes
INTRODUCTION
While interpreting a statute, true intent of the legislature shall have to be gathered and interpreted in its proper spirit having due regard to the language used in the statute. In interpreting a statute, Court refer to external aid in case the meaning of the statute is not clear.
Courts may seek help to the external aids in case of repugnancy and inconsistency in the provision of the statute or aids when they are not available inside the statute but available outside the statute. Some of the aids which are available outside the statute are –
DICTIONARIES
When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is
permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which
that word is understood in common parlance. However, in selecting one out of
the various meanings of a word, regard,must always be had to the content as it
is a fundamental rule that the meanings of the word, regard must always be had
to the content as it is a fundamental rule that the meanings of words and
expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the content in which
they appear. Therefore, when the content makes the meaning of a word quite
clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out
of the diverse meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicographers.
Further, words and expressions at times have a technical or a legal meaning and
in that case they are understood in that sense. Again, judicial decisions
expounding the meaning of words in construing statutes in pari materia will
have more weight than the meaning furnished by dictionaries.
In Kanwar Singh vs. Delhi Administration (AIR
1965 SC 871), the dictionary meaning of the word ‘abandoned’ was not
relied upon. The fact was that the officers of Delhi Administration were beaten
up by the appellants when they were pounding up stray cattle. Being charged
under section 332 IPC, the appellants pleaded the right of private defence of
property. It was decided whether the cattle being pounded were abandoned or not
under section 418, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act.
The dictionary meaning of the word ‘abandoned’ means complete
leaving of a thing so as to become ownerless.
The Supreme Court did not accept the dictionary meaning of
the word ‘abandoned’ as it did not carry sense in which the Legislature used
it. The Supreme Court held that the word ‘abandoned’ in the context meanings
“left unattended or let loose”.
USE OF FOREIGN DECISIONS
The use of foreign decisions in interpretation of a statute
is not an uncommon thing in the legal history. The assistance of such foreign
decision is subject to the qualification that the prime importance is always to
be given to the language of the relevant statute, the circumstances and the
setting in which it is enacted and the conditions where it is to be applied and
that it is not to be forgotten that there is always an element of risk in
taking ready and hasty assistance from such decisions.
In fact almost all the Acts and
Statutes in India are of British origin, and even during the post independence
period reference to English decisions was a common practice because of
historical reasons. The practice was not given up inspite of severe warning and
caution administered by the Privy Council. The reason behind it is that our
courts have gained considerable assistance from foreign decisions in
interpreting certain provisions of our Constitution.
In Sachinanda Banerjee, Assistant
Collector Customs, Calcutta vs. Sita Ram Agarwala, it was held that
when an Indian Act is modelled on a prior English Act, decisions construing the
provisions of the English Act are referred to as helpful guide for construing
corresponding provisions of the Indian Act.
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY
According to the English practice, it is clear that the
intent of the Parliament which passed the Act is not to be gathered from the
parliamentary history of the statute. The Bill in its original form or the
amendments considered during its progress in the legislature are not admissible
aids to construction.
In contrast
to the English practice, the rule of exclusion of parliamentary history has
been very much relaxed. It has been held that the said rule is not violated by
resorting to debates as a means of ascertaining the environment at the time of enactment
of a particular law, that is, the history of the period when it was adopted.
The Supreme Court has enunciated the
rule of exclusion of parliamentary history in the way it is enunciated by
English courts but on many occasion Court
has used the aid of Parliamentary history in resolving questions of
construction.
It has been
held that speeches made by the members of the Constituted Assembly in the
course of the debates on the draft Constitution cannot be admitted as extrinsic
aid to the construction of the Constitution, in the same way, the debates on a
Bill in Parliament on a Bill not admissible for construction of the Act which
is ultimately enacted.
In State of Travaco. V. Bombay Co. Ltd. AIR SC 365, it was held that a
speech made in the course of the debate a bill could at best be indicative of
the subjective intent of the speaker but it could not reflect the inarticulate
mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill. Nor is it
reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord.
In
Ashwini Kumar Ghose vs. Arabinda
Bose AIR 1952 SC 369, the observation of the Court was that the
acceptance of amendments to a bill in
the course of Parliamentary proceedings forms part of the pre-enactment history
of a statute and as such might throw valuable light on the intention of the
legislature when the language used in the statute admitted of more than one construction. In this case,
it was also considered that the statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
Bill should be ruled out as an aid to construction of the statute.
Hence,
according to the modern practice it can be said that the parliamentary history
of legislation in not a permissible aid in construing a statute. The testimony
of the legislators, the history of Act, the Parliament debates etc. Are the
materials forming part of preliminary discussions of legislation which can
support an interpretation. Legislative records may provide a clue to the
circumstances leading to the enactment of the statute. Reports of relevant
legislative committee may also be consulted. But the Court cannot treat a
statute in the light of Parliamentary history.
HISTORICAL FACTS AND
SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES
Sometimes history of the legislation
also plays an important role in ascertaining the true meaning of the enactment.
The history of the Act and the reasons for passing the enactment may be
necessary to understand the true meaning of the enactment. The Court is
entitled to take into account such historical facts as may be necessary to
understand the subject matter of the statute or to have regard to the
surrounding circumstances which existed at the time of passing of the statute.
The Court takes seeks to understand the history of the legislation because the
words used in the statute alone cannot be enough to find out the object and purpose
of the legislature in passing the statute.
In Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla vs. A.D. Divikar (AIR 1957 SC 121),
the Supreme Court observed that we
are not limited to the lifeless words of the statute and formalistic canons of
construction in our search of the intent of Parliament in our case and in
construing a statute, we may with propriety recur to the history of the times
when it was passed.
LATER SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The
circumstances existing at the time of the passing of the statute is referred in
a modern statute according to social, political and economic development or to
scientific interventions at later time not known at the time of passing of the
statute. Therefore, a statute may be interpreted to include circumstances or
situations which were unknown or did not exist at the time of the enactment of
the statute.
In Senior Electric Inspector vs.
Laxminarayan Chopra (AIR 1962) , it was held by the Supreme
Court that the definition of ‘ Telegraph Line’ in the Indian Telegraph Act,
1885 which is included by reference in
the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 is wide enough to take in electric lines used
for the purpose of wireless telegraph.
Again
in Mobarik Ali Ahmad vs. State of Bombay
(AIR 1957), Supreme Court emphasised that the Indian Penal Code should be
construed, as far as possible its language permits, with reference to notion of
criminal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the Code was enacted.
REFERENCE TO OTHER STATUTES
Another
statutes can re referred in interpreting the statute under consideration only
when it is shown that the two statutes are similar. This is termed as external
aid to interpretation.
Statutes
in pari materia is also called external aid to interpretation. Statutes in pari
material are those statutes which deal with the same subject matter or forming
part of the same system.
As
far as interpretation of statutes in pari materia is concerned, the explanation
of key words in the statutes having the same subject matter and object can be
used to interpret the same language or words used in the subsequent statute
having the same subject matter and object. Whenever any ambiguity arises regarding
the meaning of a word of expression, then reference may be made to similar
earlier statute or statutes.
For
example, in State of Madras vs. A.
Vaidyanath Iyer (AIR 1958) it was held that the definition of the
expression “ shall presume” in the Indian Evidence Act has been utilised to
construe the words “it shall be
presumed” in Section 4 of the ‘Prevention of Corruption Act, 1997.
CONCLUSION
In
conclusion, any statute alone cannot be interpreted in plain meaning if it
lacks clear language. For construing the true intent of the legislature in
enacting a statute, the Court require the external aid to construction.
0 Comments